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Abstract. In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences
the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However,
we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum num-
ber of assignees or the distribution of the assignees according to their types. These
two requirements can be challenging to reconcile in practice. In this paper we de-
scribe two real applications, a project allocation problem and a workshop assignment
problem, both involving some distributional constraints. We used integer program-
ming techniques to find reasonably good solutions with regard to the stability and
the distributional constraints. Our approach can be useful in a variety of different
applications, such as resident allocation with lower quotas, controlled school choice or
college admissions with affirmative action.
Keywords: assignment, stable matching, two-sided markets, project
allocation, integer linear programming
1 Introduction
A centralised matching scheme has been used since 1952 in the US to allocate junior
doctors to hospitals [36]. Later, the same technology has been used in school choice
programs in large cities, such as New York [3] and Boston [4]. Similar schemes have been
∗A preliminary version of this paper has appeared in the proceedings of the 10th Japanese-Hungarian
Symposium on Discrete Mathematics and its Applications, 2017.
†Supported by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences under its Momentum Programme (LP2016-3/2016),
by OTKA grant no. K108673.
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established in Europe for university admissions and school choice as well. For instance,
in Hungary both the secondary school and the higher education admission schemes are
organised nationwide, see [10] and [11], respectively. Furthermore, it can also be used
to allocate courses to students under priorities [18]. In the above mentioned applications
it is common that the preferences of the applicants and the rankings of the parties on
the other side are collected by a central coordinator and a so-called stable allocation is
computed based on the matching algorithm of Gale and Shapley [24]. Two-sided matching
markets, and the above applications in particular, have been extensively studied in the last
decades, see [39] and [32] for overviews from game theoretical and computational aspects,
respectively.
In this paper we describe two recent applications at the Corvinus University of Bu-
dapest, where we used a similar method with some interesting caveats. In the first appli-
cation we had to allocate students to projects in such a way that the number of students
allocated to each project is between a lower and an upper quota, together with an addi-
tional requirement over the distribution of the foreign students. This is a natural require-
ment present in many applications, such as the Japanese resident allocation scheme [28].
In the second application we scheduled students to companies for solving case studies in
a conference, and here again we faced some distributional constraints.
We decided to use integer programming techniques for solving both applications. We
had at least three reasons for choosing this technique. The first is that with IP formulations
we can easily encode those distributional requirements that the organisers requested, so
this solution method is robust to accommodate special features. The second reason is
that the computational problem became NP-hard as the companies submitted lists with
ties. Using ties in the ranking was by our recommendation to the companies, because ties
give us more flexibility when finding a stable solution under the distributional constraints.
We describe this issue more in detail shortly. Finally, our third reason for choosing IP
techniques was that it facilitates multi-objective optimisation, e.g. finding a most-stable
solution if a stable solution does not exist under the strict distributional constraints.
The usage of integer programming techniques for solving two-sided stable matching
problems is very rare in the applications, and the theoretical studies on this topic have
only started very recently. The reason is that the problems are relatively large in most
applications, and the Gale-Shapley type heuristics are usually able to find stable solutions,
even in potentially challenging cases. A classical example is the resident allocation problem
with couples, which has been present in the US application for decades, and it is still
solved by the Roth-Peranson heuristic [38]. The underlying matching problem is NP-hard
[35], but heuristic solutions are quite successful in practice, see also [12] on the Scottish
application. However, integer programming and constraints programming techniques have
been developed very recently and they turned out to be powerful enough to solve large
random instances [13], [16] and [19]. Similarly encouraging results have been obtained
for some special college admission problems, which are present in the Hungarian higher
education system. These special features also makes the problem NP-hard in general, but
at least one of these challenging features, turned out to be solvable even in a real data
involving more than 150,000 applicants [6]. Finally, the last paper that we highlight with
regard to this topic deals with the problem of finding stable solutions in the presence of
ties [31]. However, we are not aware of any papers that would study IP techniques for the
problem of distributional constraints.
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Distributional constraints are present in many two-sided matching markets. In the
Japanese resident allocation the government wants to ensure that the doctors are evenly
distributed across the country, and to achieve this they imposed lower quotas on the
number of doctors allocated in each region [28, 29, 25]. Distributional objectives can
also appear in school choice programs, where the decision makers want to control the
socio-ethnical distribution of the students [2, 15, 20, 21]. Furthermore, the same kind
of requirements are implemented in college admission schemes with affirmative action [1]
such as the Brazilian college admission system [7] and the admission scheme to Indian
engineering schools [8].
When stable solution does not exists for the strict distributional constraints then we
either need to relax stability or to adjust the distributional constraints. In this study we
will consider the trade-off between these two goals, and develop some reasonable solution
concepts. We use integer programming technique to solve the problems arising from the
two real applications and also for the simulations.
2 Definitions and preliminaries
Many-to-one stable matching markets have been defined in many context in the litera-
ture. In the classical college admissions problem by Gale and Shapley [24] the students
are matched to colleges. In the computer science literature this problem setting is typi-
cally called Hospital / Residents problem (HR), due to the National Resident Matching
Program (NRMP) and other related applications. In our paper we will refer the two sets
as applicants A = {a1, . . . , an} and companies {C = c1, . . . cm}. Let uj denote the upper
quota of company cj.
Regarding the preferences, we assume that the applicants provide strict rankings over
the companies, but the companies may have ties in their rankings. This model is sometimes
referred to as Hospital / Residents problem with Ties (HRT) in the computer science
literature, see e.g. [32]. In our context, let rij denote the rank of company cj in ai’s
preference list, meaning that applicant ai prefers cj to ck if and only if rij < rik. Let sij
be an integer representing the score of ai by company cj , meaning that ai is preferred over
ak by company cj if sij > skj. Note that here two applicants may have the same score
at a company, so sij = skj is possible. Let s¯ denote the maximum possible score at any
company and let E be the set of applications. A matching is a subset of applications,
where each applicant is assigned to at most one company and the number of assignees at
each company is less than or equal to the upper quota. A matching is complete if every
student is allocated. A matching is said to be stable if for any applicant-company pair not
included in the matching either the applicant is matched to a more preferred company or
the company filled its upper quota with applicants of the same or higher scores.
In the classical college admission problem, that we refer to as HR, a stable solution is
guaranteed to exist, and the two-versions of the Gale-Shapley algorithm [24] find either
a student-optimal or a college optimal solution, respectively. Furthermore, this algorithm
can be implemented to run in linear time in the number of applications. Moreover, the
student-proposing variant was also proved to be strategyproof for the students [36], which
means that no student can ever get a better partner by submitting false preferences.
Finally, the so-called Rural Hospitals Theorem [37] states that the same students are
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matched in every stable solution, the number of assignees does not vary across stable
matchings for any college, and for the less popular colleges where the upper quota is not
filled the set of assigned students is fixed.
When extending the classical college admission problem with the possibility of having
ties in the colleges’ rankings, that we referred to as an HRT instance, the existence of
a stable solution is still guaranteed, since we can break the ties arbitrarily, and a stable
solution for the strict preferences is also stable for the original ones. However, now the set
of matched students and the size of the stable matchings can vary. Take just the following
simple example: we have two applicants, a1 and a2 first applying to college c1 with the
same score and applicant a2 also applies to college c2 as her second choice. Here, if we
break the tie at c1 in favour of a1 then we get the matching a1c1, a2c2, whilst if we break
the tie in favour of a2 then the resulting stable matching is a2c1 (thus a1 is unmatched).
The problem of finding a maximum size stable matching turned out to be NP-hard [33],
and has been studied extensively in the computer science literature, see e.g. [32]. Note
that when the objective of an application is to find a maximum size stable matchings, such
as the Scottish resident allocation scheme [27], then the mechanism is not stategyproof.
To see this, we just have to reconsider the above example, and assume that originally a1
also found c2 acceptable and would ranked it second, just like a2. By removing c2 from
her list, a1 is now guaranteed to get c1 is the maximum size stable solution, however, for
the original true preferences a2 would have an equal chance to get her first choice c1.
2.1 Introduction of lower quotas
In our first application the organisers of the project allocations wanted to ensure a min-
imum number of students for each company. Similar requirements have been imposed
for the Japanese regions with regard to the number of residents allocated there. In our
model, we introduce a lower quota lj for each company cj and we require that in a feasible
matching the number of assignees at any company is between the lower and upper quotas.
Stability is defined as before. We refer to the setting with strict preferences as Hospitals
/ Residents problem with Lower quotas (HRL) and the case with ties is referred to as
Hospitals / Residents problem with Ties and Lower Quotas (HRTL).
Regarding HRL, the Rural Hospitals Theorem implies that the existence of a stable
matching that obeys both the lower an upper quotas can be decided efficiently. This is
because we just find one stable matching by considering the upper quotas only, and if the
lower quotas are violated then there exists no stable solution under these distributional
constraints. This problem can be still solved efficiently when the sets of companies have
common lower and upper quotas in a laminar system, see [23].
However, the problem of deciding the existence of a stable matching for HRTL is NP-
hard. To see this, we just have to remark that the problem of finding a complete stable
matching for HRT with unit quotas is also NP-hard [33], so if we require both lower and
upper quotas to be equal to one for all companies then the two problems are equivalent.
Furthermore, no mechanism that finds a stable matching whenever there exists one can
be strategyproof.
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2.2 Adding types and distributional constraints
In our first application, the organisers want to distribute the foreign students across the
projects almost equally. In our second application, there are target numbers for the
total number of Hungarian, European and other participants and there are also specific
lower quotas for Hungarian students by some companies. These applications motivate our
problems with applicant types and distributional constraints.
Let T = {T 1, . . . , T p} be the set of types, where t(ai) denotes the type of applicant
ai. For a company cj, let l
k
j and u
k
j denote the lower and upper quota for the number of
assignees of type T k. Furthermore, we may also set lower and upper quotas for any type
of applicants for a set of companies. In particular, we denote the lower and upper quotas
for the total number of applicants of type T k assigned in the matching by Lk and Uk,
respectively. The set of feasibility constraints for the matching is now extended with these
lower and upper quotas. Yet, the original stability condition, which does not consider the
types of the applicants, remains the same.
3 Solution concepts and integer programming formulations
In all of our formulations we use binary variables xij ∈ {0, 1} for each application coming
from applicant ai to company cj . This can be seen as a characteristic function of the
matching, where xij = 1 corresponds to the case when ai is assigned to cj .
When describing the integer formulations, first we keep the stability condition fixed
while we implement the set of distributional constraints. Then we investigate the ways
one can relax stability or find most-stable solutions under the distributional constraints.
3.1 Finding stable solutions under distributional constraints
In this subsection we gradually add constraints to the model by keeping the classical
stability condition.
Classical HR instance
First we describe the basic IP formulation for HR described in [9]. The feasibility of a
matching can be ensured with the following two sets of constraints.
∑
j:(ai,cj)∈E
xij ≤ 1 for each ai ∈ A (1)
∑
i:(ai,cj)∈E
xij ≤ uj for each cj ∈ C (2)
Note that (1) implies that no applicant can be assigned to more than one company,
and (2) implies that the upper quotas of the companies are respected.1
To enforce the stability of a feasible matching we can use the following constraint.
1These conditions are standard for the assignment problem as well, see a survey on this problem and
its variants [34] and an interesting application on marriage markets [17].
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
 ∑
k:rik≤rij
xik

 · uj +
∑
h:(ah,cj)∈E,shj>sij
xhj ≥ uj for each (ai, cj) ∈ E (3)
Note that for each (ai, cj) ∈ E, if ai is matched to cj or to a more preferred company
then the first term provides the satisfaction of the inequality. Otherwise, when the first
term is zero, then the second term is greater than or equal to the right hand side if and
only if the places at cj are filled with applicants with higher scores.
Among the stable solutions we can choose the applicant-optimal one by minimising
the following objective function.
∑
(ai,cj)∈E
rij · xij
Modification for HRT
When the companies can express ties the following modified stability constraints, together
with the feasibility constraints (1) and (2), lead to stable matchings. Note that here
the only difference between this and the previous constraint is that the strict inequality
shj > sij became weak.

 ∑
k:rik≤rij
xik

 · uj +
∑
h:(ah,cj)∈E,shj≥sij
xhj ≥ uj for each (ai, cj) ∈ E (4)
Extension with lower quotas
Here, we only add the lower quotas for every company.
∑
i:(ai,cj)∈E
xij ≥ lj for each cj ∈ C (5)
Adding distributional constraints
As additional constraints we require the number of assignees of a particular type to be
between the lower and upper quotas for that type at a company.
∑
i:t(ai)=T k,(ai,cj)∈E
xij ≤ u
k
j for each cj ∈ C and T
k ∈ T (6)
∑
i:t(ai)=T k,(ai,cj)∈E
xij ≥ l
k
j for each cj ∈ C and T
k ∈ T (7)
We can also add similar constraints for set of companies, or for the overall number of
different assignees at all companies. We describe the latter, as we will use it when solving
our second application.
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∑
i,j:t(ai)=T k ,(ai,cj)∈E
xij ≤ U
k for each T k ∈ T (8)
∑
i,j:t(ai)=T k ,(ai,cj)∈E
xij ≥ L
k for each T k ∈ T (9)
3.2 Relaxing stability
Adding additional constraints to the problem can cause the lack of a stable matching, even
if we added some flexibility with the ties.
One way to find a most-stable solution is to introduce nonnegative deficiency variables,
dij for each application and add them to the left side of the stability constraint (4). By
minimising the sum of these deficiencies as a first objective we can obtain a solution which
is close to be stable.

 ∑
k:rik≤rij
xik

 · uj +
∑
h:(ah,cj)∈E,shj≥sij
xhj + dij ≥ uj for each (ai, cj) ∈ E (10)
Note that here, if a pair (ai, cj) is blocking for the assignment then we need to add
more compensation dij if the number of assignees at cj that the company prefers to ai
is large. This approach can be reasonable if we want to avoid the refusal of a very good
candidate at a company. We call this solution as matching with minimum deficiency.
Alternatively, if we just want to minimise the number of blocking pairs then we can
set dij to be binary and minimise the sum of these variables under the following modified
constraints.

 ∑
k:rik≤rij
xik

 · uj +
∑
h:(ah,cj)∈E,shj≥sij
xhj + dij · uj ≥ uj for each (ai, cj) ∈ E (11)
Here, every blocking pair should be compensated by the same amount, so the number
of blocking pairs in minimised. Note that this concept has already been studied in the
literature for various models under the name of almost stable matchings, see e.g. [16].
3.3 Adjusting upper capacities, envy-free matchings
A different way of enforcing the lowers quota is to relax stability by artificially decreasing
the capacities of the companies. This was also the solution in the resident allocation
scheme in Japan [28], where the government introduced artificial upper quotas for each of
the hospitals, so that in each region the sum of these artificial upper bounds summed up
to the target capacity for that region. In the case of our motivating example of project
allocation, one simple way of achieving the lower quotas was by reducing the upper quotas
at every company.
In this solution what we essentially get is a so-called envy-free matching, studied in
[42], [41] and [5]. The matching is stable with respect to the artificial upper quotas, which
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means that the only blocking pairs that may occur with regard to the original upper quotas
are due to the empty slots created by the difference between the original and the artificial
quotas, that we call open-slot blockings.
However, one may not want to reduce the upper quotas of the companies in the same
way, perhaps some more popular companies should be allowed to have more students than
the less popular ones. Furthermore, maybe the decision on which upper quotas should be
reduced should be made depending on their effect of satisfying the lower quotas (or other
requirements). Thus, we may not want to set the artificial upper quotas in advance, but
keep them as variables, by ensuring envy-freeness in a different way. One alternative way
of enforcing envy-freeness is by the following set of constraints.
∑
k:rik≤rij
xik ≥ xhj ∀(ai, cj), (ah, cj) ∈ E, sij > shj (12)
Constraints (12) will ensure envy-freeness, by making sure that if applicant ah is as-
signed to company cj and applicant ai has higher score than ah at cj then ai must be
assigned to cj or to a more preferred company.
3.4 Within-type priorities
So far we have only considered different approaches of relaxing stability or enlarging the
set of feasible solutions in order to satisfy the distributional constraints. In this subsection
we study alternative solution concepts and methods for the case when the distributional
constraints are type-dependent. This is the case also in our motivating application, where
special requirements are set for the foreign students assigned to the companies.
When the number of students of a type does not achieve the minimum required at a
place then there are two well-known approaches. For instance in a school choice scenario,
where the ratio of an socio-ethnic group should be improved (see e.g. [2]) then one possible
affirmative action is to increase the scores of that group of students as much as needed.
The other usual solution is to set some reserved seats to those students (see e.g. [7]).
In our project allocation application our requirement is to have at least one foreign
student assigned to every company. If in a stable solution this condition would be violated
for a company then we can try to enforce the admission of a foreign student by increasing
the scores of the foreign students at this company. We call such a solution as stable
matching with type-specific scores, where the classical stability condition is required for
the adjusted scores. The second approach is to devote one place at each company to foreign
students. For this one seat the foreign students will have higher priority than the locals
irrespective of their scores, but for the rest of the spaces the usual score-based rankings
apply. We call this concept as stable matching with reserved seats for types. Note that
neither of these two concepts can always ensure that we get at least one foreign student
at each company, since they may all have high scores and they may all dislike a particular
company. However, this situation changes if we also allow to decrease the scores of a group
of students. We will describe this case after discussing the third approach.
Finally, as a third approach, we can also extend the concept of envy-free matchings
for types. We do not require any stability with regard to students of different types, but
we do require envy-freeness for students of the same type. Thus the so-called within-type
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envy-free matchings will be those who satisfy the following set of constraints.2
∑
k:rik≤rij
xik ≥ xhj ∀(ai, cj), (ah, cj) ∈ E, sij > shj, t(ai) = t(ah) = T
k, T k ∈ T (13)
That is, if ai and ah have the same type and ah is assigned to cj then the higher
ranked ai must also be assigned to cj or to a more preferred company. Note that with
this modification we extend the set of feasible solutions compared to the set of envy-free
matchings. Another important observation that is motivated by our project allocation
problem is that under some realistic assumptions a within-type envy-free matching always
exists, that we will show in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Suppose that all the companies are acceptable to every student and that the
sum of the lower quotas with regard to each type is less than equal to the number of students
of that type, and the sum of the lower quotas across types for a company is less than or
equal to the upper quota of that company, then a complete within-type envy-free matching
always exists and can be found efficiently.
Proof: We construct a within-type envy-free matching separately for each type and
then we merge them. When considering a particular type T k, we set artificial upper quotas
at the companies to be equal to the type-specific lower quotas (i.e. lkj for company cj) and
we find a stable matching Mk for this type. This stable matching must exist, since we
assumed that all the companies are acceptable to every student and the number of students
in every type is at least as much as the sum of the lower quotas for that type. We create
matching M by merging the stable matchings for the types, i.e. M =M1 ∪M2 ∪ · · · ∪Mp.
Note that no upper quota is violated in M , since we assumed that the sum of the lower
quotas across types for any company cj is less than equal to the upper quota of cj . By
the stability of Mk for every type T
k it follows that matching M is within-type envy-free.
If there is still a company cj , where the overall lower quota (lj) is not yet met, then we
increase an artificial upper quota for some at cj so that there is still some unmatched
applicants of this type. Since the total number of applicants is greater or equal to the
sum of the lower quotas, we have to achieve the lower quotas at all companies in this way.
Finally, it there are still some unmatched applicants then we increase some artificial upper
quotas for their types one-by-one, by making sure that we never exceed any overall upper
quota. At the end of this iterative process we must reach a complete within-type envy-free
matching.
We note that there is a closely related solution concept introduced by Yokoi [41] which
results in a within-type envy-free matching when restricted to our model, that we describe
in details below. The model studied in that paper is the more general so-called classified
stable matching problem where each student can have several types (e.g. gender, field of
study, nationality) and the lower and upper quotas are set for every type. When putting
their more general model in our context a student ai has justified envy towards another
student ak at company cj if ak is assigned to cj , ai prefers cj to her assignment, cj ranks
ai higher than ak, and no lower and upper quota is violated for any type when replacing
2This solution concept was called within-type ≻-compatibility by Echenique and Yenmez [20].
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ak with ai at cj . It is easy to see that under the assumptions of Theorem 1 an envy-free
matching always exists as defined by Yokoi and such a solution is a within-type envy-
free matching according to our definitions. Finally we remark that this model of Yokoi
is originated from the classified stable matching problem introduced in [26], and further
generalised in [23] and [40]. A common feature of these papers that the laminar nature
of the set requirements makes the problem polynomial time solvable. A closely related
model was studied in [22] without the laminar assumption, where the problem was proved
to by NP-hard and was solved by integer programming techniques.
Let us abbreviate a complete within-type envy-free matching as CWTEFM. Now, we
will compare this concept of CWTEFM with stable matchings with type-specific scores
and observe that they are essentially the same.
Theorem 2 Under the assumptions of Theorem 1 a complete matching is within-type
envy-free if and only if it is stable with type-specific scores.
Proof: Suppose first that M is a complete stable matching with type-specific scores,
we will see that M is also within-type envy-free by definition. Suppose for a contradiction
that there is a student ai who has justified envy against student ah of the same type at
company cj , i.e. ah is assigned to cj whilst ai has higher score at cj than ah and ai is
assigned to a less preferred company. This would mean that the pair {ai, cj} is blocking
for the adjusted scores, since both students get the same adjustment at cj, contradicting
with the stability of M .
Suppose now thatM is a CWTEFM. Let us adjust the scores of the students according
to their types at each company such that the weakest students admitted have the same
scores across types. Matching M is stable with regard to the adjusted scores, because if
a student ai is not admitted to a company cj and any better place of her preference that
it must be the case that her score at cj was less then or equal to the score of the weakest
assigned student of the same type at cj , which means that the adjusted score of ai at cj
is less than or equal to the adjusted score of every assigned student at cj.
Instead of using the above described processes of setting type-specific artificial upper
quotas or making adjustments for the scores of different types, we can also get a CWTEFM
directly by an IP formulation. We shall simply use the feasibility and distributional
constraints together with (13) and with an objective function maximising the number
of students assigned. This approach is not just more robust than the above described
two heuristics, but it has also the advantage that we can enforce additional optimality
or fairness criteria. As an additional fairness criterion we may aim to minimise the envy
across types. We can achieve this by adding deficiency variables to the left hand side
of constraints (12) for students of different types, as described in (14) below, and then
minimising the sum of the deficiencies. We refer to this solution as Min#E-CWTEFM,
that is complete within-type envy-free matching with minimum number of envy across
types.
∑
k:rik≤rij
xik + d
j
ih ≥ xhj ∀(ai, cj), (ah, cj) ∈ E, t(ai) 6= t(ah) (14)
However, we may find an envy more justified, if the score difference between the two
applicants involved is higher. Thus, by taking the score differences as the intensities of the
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envies, we can also aim to find a refined solution where the total intensities of the envies
is minimised, by using the following objective function:
∑
(sij − shj) · d
j
ih.
We call the corresponding solution complete within-type envy-free matching with min-
imum envy intensities across types, abbreviated as MinEI-CWTEFM.
If the solution is still not unique then we can further refine it, by considering two
additional objectives. Regarding the welfare of the students, we may want to minimise
the total rank of the students, leading to a Pareto-optimal assignment for them under the
constraints. We denote these solutions as MinRank-Min#E-CWTEFM and MinRank-
MinEI-CWTEFM, depending whether we minimised the number of envies or the envy
intensities in the previous round. Finally, an alternative objective can be to minimise
the number of blocking pairs due to open slots. This can be achieved by adding binary
deficiency variables to the first term of the left side of the stability constraints, as follows.

 ∑
k:rik≤rij
xik + dij

 · uj +
∑
h:(ah,cj)∈E
xhj ≥ uj for each (ai, cj) ∈ E (15)
We can then minimise the sum of these deficiency variables and find a matching within
the restricted solution set that minimises the number of open-slot blockings. We denote
these solutions as MinOSB-Min#E-CWTEFM and MinOSB-MinEI-CWTEFM, depend-
ing whether we minimised the number of envies or the envy intensities.
4 First application: CEMS project allocation
CEMS Alliance is a global co-operation of leading business schools, multinational corpo-
rations and social partners in higher education domain. These entities run together the
CEMS Master in International Management (MIM) one-year graduate program that is ac-
cessible for graduate students of the partner institutions in 29 countries in five continents.
During the one-year-program students spend one semester at their home institution and
one semester at another partner institution somewhere abroad, and they always learn in
an international environment. CEMS MIM has been ranked as a leading master program
by Financial Times in recent years.
Within the framework of the MIM program each student must carry out a business
project during the Spring semester accounting for 15ECTS credits (that is half of the
workload of the entire semester). The consultancy-like projects are designed as real life
learning experience. Business projects are done in small groups of 3-6 students in which
ideally at least one student comes from a foreign school, hence business project teams are
culturally diverse. Business projects are offered and supervised by the corporate partners
throughout the semester and they usually last for three months.
Students learn about the business projects during a kickoff event at the beginning of
the semester from company representatives and they also receive written descriptions of
the projects. After the kickoff event corporate partners evaluate all students according to
their CV-s, and students also rank the business projects in the same time. The school
assigns students to the individual projects based on these evaluations and rankings.
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At Corvinus University of Budapest the authors of this paper have been given the task
of redesigning the allocation mechanism in 2016. In previous years the mechanism was
a simple immediate acceptance mechanism (also known as Boston mechanism [4]), where
the students submitted their CV-s to their first choice companies, the companies evaluated
the candidates and then they accepted the best candidates up to their quotas and rejected
the rest. The rejected students then submitted their CV-s to further companies, but those
companies which have already filled their positions did not accept more applications. This
mechanism was heavily criticized in the literature on school choice due to its unfairness
and also because this mechanism is highly manipulable, therefore in many cities it has
been replaced by other algorithms, mainly by the deferred acceptance (or Gale-Shapley)
algorithm, see e.g. [4].
4.1 Solution plan
In 2016 there were 25 students, including 20 local and 5 foreign students, and 5 companies.
The initial upper quotas were set to 6 and the lower quotas were set to 4 at all companies.
The programme coordinator decided to set an upper quota of 2 for the foreign students at
each company to enforce diversity. In 2017 there was a slight change in the distributional
criteria, the number of students allocated to each company was set to be between 3 and 6
and at least one foreign student was required to be allocated to every company.
Our first solution plan was to ask the students to rank all the companies in a strict
order and to ask the companies to evaluate all the CV-s and rank the students weakly by
giving them scores between 1 and 103. Our intension with allowing ties was to enlarge
the set of stable solutions, even though we understand that this fairness concept is a
bit weaker, since we may accept a student and reject another one with the same score.
Allowing ties also makes the problem NP-hard already with lower quotas, as we described
in the introduction. Yet, if the ties were not allowed then the set of stable (and envy-free)
solutions would be much smaller and thus it would be harder to satisfy the distributional
constraints.
We remark that the conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied for both 2016 and 2017, since
all the students have to rank (and accept) all the companies and in 2017 we were required
to had at least one foreign student at each company, where the number of foreign students
was more than the number of companies. Therefore a complete within-type envy-free
matching always existed. Within this set of solutions we decided to minimise the number
of envies across types and their intensities as the primal objectives. As secondary objectives
we tried to minimise the total rank and the number of open-slot blockings.
Finally, since in both years it was possible to decrease the upper quotas at all com-
panies by one (and set them to 5 instead of 6), we also examined these solutions. This
was reasonable as allocating very different numbers of students to the companies seemed
problematic, especially if some of the most popular companies was forced not to fill its
quota, while less popular companies did.
3Most companies gave only integer scores, but some submitted half-integer scores as well, so ties indeed
occurred.
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2016 profiles all/foreign total rank
Solution 1: MinRank-Stable 6 1 6 6 6 34
ui = 6 1 0 0 2 2
Solution 2: MinRank-Stable 6 2 6 6 5 35
li = 2, ui = 6 1 0 1 2 1
Solution 3: MinRank-Stable 6 4 5 5 5 40
u1 = 6, ui = 5(i = 2..5) 1 0 0 2 2
Solution 4: MinRank-Stable 5 5 5 5 5 41
ui = 5 0 2 0 2 1
Solution 5: MinRank-EF 5 4 6 6 4 38
li = 4, ui = 6 0 2 1 2 0
Solution 6: MinOSB-EF 6 4 6 5 4 39
li = 4, ui = 6 1 1 1 2 0
Table 1: The results of the 2016 matching run with the number of all and foreign students
assigned to the companies and the total rank of the students.
4.2 Results in 2016
The most important results of the 2016 matching run are collected in Table 1.
In 2016 the upper bound of two for the foreign students were always satisfied without
considering it, so we leave out this question from the discussion and we focus only common
lower quotas. We were not able to find a stable solution for the original quotas of 4-6, since
one of the companies (number 2) was very unpopular and the highest number of students
that we could match there in a stable solution was 2, this is Solution 2 in Table 1. (For the
record, we also checked which would be the minimum rank solution among the stable ones,
that is Solution 1.) Therefore we decreased the upper quotas of all companies to 5, except
the most popular company (number 1) and found a stable matching with minimum total
rank (Solution 3). Note that this matching is envy-free for the original quotas. Finally we
considered the possibility of decreasing all the upper quotas to 5, as described in Solution
4. From the latter two solutions the decision maker decided to choose Solution 4, since
it was not substantially different from Solution 3 and for the companies it seemed to be
easier to communicate the common decrease of upper quotas, compared to the case when
only one company has a larger number of students.
Recently, after carefully investigating the solution concepts described in this paper,
we did another check on the possible results and computed Solutions 5 and 6. Solution 5
is an envy-free solution where the total rank is minimised. It was interesting to observe
that the most popular company (number 1) does not fill its upper quota, leading to many
open-slot blockings at that company. Solution 6 is also envy-free, but here the open-slot
blockings are minimised, but this resulted in a small decrease in the total rank.
4.3 Results in 2017
The results of the 2017 matching run are summarised in Table 2. In 2017 the number
of students was 40 among which 13 were from abroad and the number of companies was
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2017 profiles all/foreign total rank
Solution 1: MinRank-EF 6 3 6 6 6 3 6 4 66
li = 3, ui = 6 1 1 1 4 1 1 3 1
Solution 2: MinRank-Min#E-CWTEFM 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 85
ui = 5, wEF, min 1 3 2 3 1 1 1 1
Solution 3: MinRank-MinEI-CWTEFM 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 105
ui = 5 1 4 1 2 1 1 1 2
Table 2: The results of the 2017 matching run with the number of all and foreign students
assigned to the companies and the total rank of the students.
8. Due to the higher proportion of foreign students, the organisers decided to require
the allocation of at least one foreign student to each company. The initial call suggested
groups of sizes between 3 and 6, but in this year also we investigated the solutions when
every upper quota was decreased to 5. In the latter case the lower quotas for the foreign
students were not automatically satisfied, so we found within-type envy-free solutions and
then as a first objective we either minimised the number of envies across types or we
minimised the intensities of the envies. As a secondary objective we tried to minimise the
total rank (there was no open-slots blocking when the upper quotas were commonly set
to 5).
Solution 1 is envy-free, and the total rank is minimised. As intuitively expected,
the two least popular companies have only three students allocated each and a medium
popular company has four students, whilst the popular companies receive six students.
Solutions 2 and 3 are both within-type envy free for upper quotas 5. Solution 2 minimises
the number of envies as the first objective and then the total rank. Solution 3 minimises
the intensities of the envies and then the total rank. (Note that we also computed the
minimal envy solutions without requiring within-type envy freeness, and essentially we
received the same two solutions.) It is interesting to know that only one justified envy
was present in both Solutions 2 and 3, and the intensity of this envy was 1 in Solution 2
and 12 in Solution 3. However, these two solutions were rather different, and Solution 2
had much smaller total rank. Thus Solution 2 was clearly found better than Solution 3 by
the decision maker. When comparing the first two solutions, the decision maker selected
Solution 2, due to the more balanced sizes of groups.
4.4 Discussion, further questions
Here we discuss our findings and possible questions for the future.
Importance of the distributional requirements. We have considered our dis-
tributional constraints as hard bounds, the only relaxation we tested was the common
decrease of the upper quotas. However, in many applications the distributional goals are
softer, and thus may be violated. For instance, in school choice the exact proportional-
ity with regard to ethnicity or gender may be too demanding and unnecessary to satisfy,
these are rather just general aims. In such situations one may insist of the stability or the
envy freeness of the solution and want to satisfy the distributional constraints as much as
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possible. Finally, the trade-off between fairness and distributional goals may be balanced
by relaxing both requirements at the same time.
Stability versus envy-freeness. Leaving some slots empty to satisfy the distribu-
tional constraints is a natural way to relax stability. This is also used in the Japanese
resident allocation programme, where artificial upper quotas have been set to the hospitals
in order to satisfy the regional lower quotas [28]. However, the open-slot blocking can also
be seen as unfair from both the students’ and the companies’ points of views, especially
when a popular company has to give up an intern. Note also that the open-slot blockings
are relative to the original quotas. In our application the decision maker ended up choosing
solutions in both years where the upper quotas of the companies were commonly reduced
by one. These solutions admit a high number of open-slot blockings with regarding the
original quotas, whilst if they are envy free for the original quotas then they are also stable
(with no open-slot blockings) for the decreased quotas. Thus these chosen solutions can
be seen more fair from the students’ point of view, as they do not regret their rejections
by a company with an open slot.
Importance of within-type envy-freeness: In our analyses we assumed that
within-type envy-freeness is an important requirement that we obeyed in all solutions.
Note that in the 2017 run we also tested the solution when this requirement was relaxed
and we did not find a significant difference in the solutions. It is an interesting question
how important this requirement is, and the answer can depend on the actual application.
If the separation of the types is significant and there is a big difference between their per-
formance (e.g. regarding the ethnicity in college admission) then within-type envy-freeness
can be crucial.
Minimising the number of justified envies or their intensities. In our 2017
run we had a significant difference between our two recommended solutions based on
minimising the number of justified envies and their intensities, respectively. In our case
the former solution had much better total ranking for the students, but one can easily
create an example where the opposite would happen. If the intensities of the blocking are
minimised then this means that the average difference between the scores of the students
who have envy towards one to another is small. This can be more acceptable than having
large score differences. In fact, if the maximum score difference is not higher than one in
our application, then we could say that this solution could be seen weakly stable if the
scoring by the companies were less finer, say used score range 1-5 instead of the current
range of 1-10.
Strict versus weak rankings. Using ties in the rankings of the companies was by our
recommendation in order to enlarge the set of stable (or envy-free) matchings. However,
in this case stability (and envy-freeness) is weaker, the rejection of a student by a company
can be explained by the admittance of another student with equal score or higher. Thus,
this can be seen unfair by the student rejected, therefore in many applications (e.g. school
choice in New York, Boston and college admissions in Ireland and Turkey) the ties are
broken by lotteries or by other random factors. Ties make the problem of satisfying lower
quotas NP-hard, whilst this is a polynomial-time solvable problem for strict rankings, see
e.g. [23]. Furthermore, the mechanism can become highly manipulable by the students for
ties depending on the goals of the optimisation.
Incentive issues. A mechanism is strategy-proof for the students if neither of them
can get a better match by submitting false preferences. This property holds for the
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student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism in the classical college admission model
of Gale and Shapley (see e.g. [39]). Strategy-proofness can also be satisfied by modified
variants of the deferred-acceptance mechanism for the case of lower quotas, as suggested
also for the Japanese resident allocations [28, 29, 25]. However, if we allow ties and we
consider goals such as rank-minimisation then our mechanism becomes manipulable. A
simple manipulation strategy for a medium-strong student can be to put her top choice
as first choice, but instead of putting her true second choice in the second slot she can
put some companies which are not achievable for her in any stable solution. If there is
another student with the very same score and very same preferences submitting her true
preferences and there is only one place left at their most preferred company then the
rank-maximising algorithm with assign the manipulating student there, and the truth-
telling student to the second company, since the alternative solution by exchanging the
two students would result in higher total rank. Despite of this issue of manipulability,
we believe that the expected gains of manipulations are negligible and their risks can be
high, so in a Bayesien sense it is unlikely that a student could get a positive expected gain
by manipulating. However, we admit that this hypothesis would be very hard to prove
formally.
Bound the length of preference lists. In 2016 there were 25 students and 5
companies, in 2017 there were 40 students and 8 companies, so the screening costs of
the companies have increased a lot. If this tendency will continue then the organisers
of the programme may need to reconsider the requirement of providing full rankings. A
reasonable solution in such situations is to have two rounds. In the first the student are
required to rank a fixed number of companies, say five), and it is not guaranteed that all
the students can be allocated to acceptable companies that they ranked. In the second
round either no preferences are asked from the students or the organisers can elicit the
preferences of the unmatched students over the companies with remaining positions. This
is a standard technique also in school choice (e.g. in New York [3]), although here we would
face new challenges to ensure the satisfaction of the distributional requirements.
5 Second application: Workshop assignment
After running the 2016 project allocation, we received very positive feedbacks from the
students, and in fact two students approached us asking for a help in selecting and as-
signing conference participants to companies involved in a case study workshop within the
conference.
The number of participants to be selected was 60, and they had to be assigned to three
companies in a given proportion, the first company had to receive 16 students and at least
8 Hungarians, the second and the third companies had to receive 22 students each. There
were 13 pre-selected students (the country leaders of the organisation) whose assignments
were fixed in advance, so we only had to select and assign the 47 remaining slots.
The conference organisers also agreed on the proportion of the local, regional and other
students to be selected. In particular, we had to select 25 Hungarian students from the 29
Hungarian applicants, further 12 regional students from the 15 regional applicants (outside
Hungary) and 10 other students from the 19 other applicants (outside the region). Thus,
we had overall exact quotas (i.e. equal lower and upper quotas) for each type of students,
16
just as described in 8 and 9.
In order to satisfy these requirements we thought that we not only try to keep the
solution within-type envy-free, which is also stable with type-specific scores as proved in
Theorem 2, but we tried to keep the extra scores given to each type of students be the
same across companies. We call this solution concept a stable matching with equal type-
specific scores. With an iterative testing we could indeed find such a stable solution by
adding 7 extra points to all Hungarian students, 3 extra points to all regional students,
and zero to the other students, where the students had to rank all the three companies
and the companies gave scores (1-10) on all the applicants.
It is an interesting question whether a stable matching with equal type-specific scores
always exists in our model, under the assumption that all pairs are acceptable. We state
this as a conjecture below and prove it for two types.
Conjecture 3 When all the pairs are acceptable then a stable matching with equal type-
specific scores always exists for exact quotas.
To prove the conjecture for two types, we will use some well-known theorems listed
below.
Theorem 4 [Well-known results on HR/HRT instances]
i) (Characterisation, see e.g. [27]) A matching µ is weakly stable for an instance I of
HRT if and only if it is stable for an instance I ′ of HR that is obtained by some
tie-breaking from I.
ii) (Rural hospitals [37]) For an instance I of HR the set of allocated students and the
number of seats filled at the companies are fixed across the stable matchings.
iii) (Vacancy chains [14]) Suppose that I is an instance of HR. If I ′ is obtained from I by
adding a new student ai then the set of allocated students either 1) remains the same,
2) it is extended by ai, or 3) it is extended by ai and another student, aj becomes
unallocated. If I ′ is obtained from I by increasing the upper quota of a company then
the set of allocated students either 1) remains the same, or 2) it is extended by one
student.
Proof:[of Conjecture 3 for two types] Suppose that we have a project allocation problem
with two types of students, A1 = {a1, a2, . . . an1} and A2 = {an1+1, an1+2, . . . , an1+n2},
companies C = {c1, . . . , cm} and exact quotas L
1 = U1 and L2 = U2. Let U denote
the total capacity, i.e., U =
∑
j=1..m uj. Without loss of generality we suppose that
L1 + L2 = U with L1 ≤ n1 and L
2 ≤ n2, and m ≤ n1 + n2, which implies that all the
weakly stable matchings have size U , since we assume that every student-company pair is
mutually acceptable. Let e denote the extra score given to students of the first type. Note
that if e is a high number then all the first type students are admitted up to the total
quota and if e is very small (negative) then all the second type student are admitted up to
the total quota. However, the number of first type students admitted does not necessarily
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grow when we increase e.4 Let I denote the original instance of HRT and let Ie be the
instance of HRT obtained after adding point e to all students in A1. For a matching M let
|M |1 denote the number of first type student allocated and similarly, let |M |2 denote the
number of second type students allocated in M . The goal is to find a suitable extra score
e such that there exists a weakly stable matching M for Ie such that |M |1 = L
1 (which
implies that |M |2 = L
2). In fact, we will construct a HR instance I ′e, obtained from Ie
by tie-breaking, such that matching M is stable for I ′e with the required distributional
property.
As we already noted, if e is a large negative number then |M |1 = 0 for any stable
matching M in Ie and if e is a very large positive number then |M |1 = min{n1,m}. For
instance Ie of HRT, let I
<1
e denote the HR instance where all the ties are broken in favour
of A1 students (and among the students of the same type we use an arbitrary tie-breaking,
say, according to their indices). Similarly, let I<2e denote the HR instance, where we break
all the ties in favour of A2 students. First, we have to observe that I<1e is the same as I
<2
e+1
for any e. Note also that the number of allocated first type students (and their set) is fixed
for any HR instance by Theorem 4/ii) across all stable matchings. Therefore there must
exist a number e such that for any stable matching Me−1 for instance I
<1
e−1(= I
<2
e ) we
have |Me−1|1 ≤ L
1, and for any stable matching Me for instance I
<1
e we have |Me|1 ≥ L
1.
We will show that there is an instance I ′e, obtained by tie-breaking from Ie, such that for
every stable matching the number of allocated A1 students is exactly L1.
We start from I<2e and we will gradually transform it into I
<1
e by giving higher priority
in the tie-breaking to one A1 student in each step. Let I0e = I
<2
e , and for each i ∈ [1..n1] let
Iie denote the HR instance where we favour the students {a1, . . . , ai} over students in A
2,
who are favoured to student in {ai+1, . . . , an1}. What we will show is that ifM is any stable
matching for Iie and M
′ is any stable matching for Ii+1e then |M |1 − 1 ≤ |M
′| ≤ |M |1 + 1,
so the number of A1 students allocated can either increase or decrease by at most one.
This will imply that we must get an instance Iie, where the number of first type students
is exactly L1.
To prove the above inequalities we have to consider two situations. First, let us assume
that ai+1 is unmatched in M (and so in every stable matching for I
i
e). ThusM would also
be stable if we would remove ai+1 from I
i
e. Let us now put back ai+1, but with higher
priority, creating instance Ii+1e . By Theorem 4/iii) either the number of A
1 students
remain the same or it increases by one. Suppose now that ai+1 is allocated in M to
company cj . M will remain stable if we remove both ai+1 and one seat at cj from I
i
e,
while the number of A1 students allocated in the reduced matching decreases by one. If
we add back one seat at cj and subsequently we also add back ai+1 with increased priority,
creating instance Ii+1e , then from Theorem 4/iii) we know that in each of these two steps
the number of A1 students matched either remains the same or increases by one. So, in
overall, the number of A1 students can either decrease by one, remain the same, or increase
4The following example illustrates this. Let us have A1 = {a1, a2, a3} and A
2 = {a4, a5}, and C =
{c1, c2, c3} with quota 1 at each company. Suppose that every student prefers c1 to c2 and c2 to c3. The
students have the following scores: s1,1 = 5, s1,2 = 7, s1,3 = 1, s2,1 = 1, s2,2 = 1, s2,3 = 3, s3,1 = 1,
s3,2 = 1, s3,3 = 1, s4,1 = 6, s4,2 = 1, s4,3 = 6, s5,1 = 2, s5,2 = 6, s5,3 = 2. When no extra score is added to
A1 then the unique stable matching is M = {a1c2, a2c3, a4c1}, and when we increase the score of students
in A1 then the unique stable matching is M ′ = {a1c1, a4c3, a5c2}, thus the number of first type students
allocated decreases.
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by one. This completes our proof.
6 Conclusion
We investigated different solution concepts for stable matching problems with distribu-
tional constraints motivated by two real applications where we had to design the alloca-
tion mechanism. We chose integer programming as the solution technique which proved
to be successful for these relatively small applications. We believe that our solution con-
cepts and techniques could be considered in other applications as well, such as controlled
school choice and university admission with affirmative action. As far as the participants
are concerned, we have received very positive feedbacks from both the students and the
companies, especially compared to the previous years. There are still plenty of interesting
questions to investigate mostly about the importance of different fairness criteria and the
trade-off between fairness and the distributional requirements.
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